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The article on the following pages is based upon the Report of the British Royal
Commission on Capital Punishment by Command of Her Majesty, September, 1953.
(H. M.'s Stationery Office, Comd. Number 8932.) It is referred to in this article
as the "'Report.'--EDIOR.
To retain the death penalty is not the same
as multiplying it.
CESARE LOMBROSO. 1
Retention of capital punishment posited in the Royal Warrant 2
circumscribed the Commissioners' inquiry. This ambient directive sub-
mitted for their consideration the core problem4 whether liability to
suffer that forfeit should be limited or modified. Several derivative5
and homocentrical questions were similarly sent the Commission. To
these matters the Prime Minister 6 added his request that the Commis-
sion consider whether any change should be made in method of execu-
tion. The threshold stricture permeated their investigation and gener-
ated a concept of purpose, epitomized in the Commissioners' recitation:
Our duty then, as we understand it, has been to look for means of confining the
scope of punishment as. narrowly as is possible without impairing the efficacy
attributed to it.
1. CRIME, ITS CAUSES AND REMEDIES, §238, p. 427 (Horton Transl., 1918).
2. Dated May 4, 1949.
The thirteen Commissioners, named in this Warrant, initiated their activities with a pre-
liminary conference on May 27, 1949. Some sixty-three meetings were held.
Several administrative matters, embodied in the Warrant, are worthy of mention. Broad
investigative powers were conferred upon any four or more Commissioners. Their investiga-
tive power was amply implemented by express authorization to call witnesses; to call for
information in writing; to examine documentary materials and by powers of visitation.
See: H. Finer, The British System (Congressional Investigations: A Symposium), is
U. oF CHI. L. REv. 521, 554 (1951) for an enlightening description of the role played by
Royal Commissions in England.
3. Prime Minister Attlee, speaking in the House of Commons on January 20, 1949, dis-
pelled any doubts concerning interpretation. Abolition of capital punishment was clearly
outside the scope of this inquiry. Report, p. 3.
4. The total proposition was described in the Warrant as follows: "... We have deemed
it expedient that a Commission should forthwith issue to consider and report whether liability
under the criminal law in Great Britain to suffer capital punishment for murder should be
limited or modified, and if so, to what extent and by what means, for how long and
under what conditions persons who would otherwise have been liable to suffer capital
punishment should be detained, and what changes in the existing law and the prison
system would be required; and to inquire into and take account of the position in those
countries whose experience and practice may throw light on these questions.... " Report, iii.
5. Report, p. 4.
6. Ibid.
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That premise launches the trichotomic underpinnings on which the
framework of the entire Report has been erected, and the conclusions
and recommendations of this Commission are sorted into these com-
partments, viz.:7 (I) Limitation or modification of the liability to
suffer capital punishment;8 (II) Alternatives to capital punishment and
(III) Methods of execution.
Acting well within the ambit of the Royal mandate, the Commis-
sioners reported several findings in narrative form, which were recast,
distilled and itemized into some eighty-nine separate statements of
conclusions9 and recommendations.
Those pertaining to modification or limitation of liability to suffer
the death penalty must be examined in the environment of the Com-
mission's statement10 prefacing all matters pertaining to part I i.e. "...
Our inquiry has thus been restricted in effect to trying to find some
practical half-way house between the present scope of the death penalty
and its abolition. As we proceeded with this task, we have been com-
pelled to recognize that the range of our quest is very narrow . ..
It is clear that a state has been reached where there is little room for
further limitation short of abolition."
While there are patent correspondencies between several of the
enumerated conclusions contained in the itemization, and others which
represent collateral considerations, the following are the ultimate rec-
ommendations,1" on the key issue:
7. These are the verbatim topics and captions corresponding to the three major divisions
of the Report: Part I. contains ten chapters and encompasses the scope of the death penalty,
function of this type of punishment, constructive malice, provocation, categories of murder
and offenders, insanity and mental abnormality, criminal responsibilitiy, diminished respon-
sibility, questions of practice and procedure concerning insanity and mental abnormality,
redefinition of murder, proposals concerning judicial discretion and proposals affecting the
Royal Prerogative of Mercy (Report, pp. 5 ff.) ; Part II. is devoted to detention, treatment
and after care (Report, pp. 215 ff.) ; Part III. presents a study of various problems arising
in connection with executions (Report, pp. 240 ff.).
For an historical account of the Royal Perogative of Mercy, see L. RADZINOwicz, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW (The Movement for Reform, 1750-1833), (London, Mac-
Millan, 1948).
8. Previous proposals for limiting or modifying the liability under consideration in the
instant Report are developed in Part I, pp. 1 ff., and 2 R. C. Evid., pp. 7 ft. This is the
historical portion of the Home Office?'s memorandum, submitted to the present Commission.
It is interesting to note that a prior Commission, in 1866, recommended that there be two
degrees of murder and that problems, comparable to those involved here, were considered at
this early date. Upon conviction for murder the death penalty is still mandatory in
England.
9. These final conclusions are reduced to short statements in the "Summary of Conclu-
sions" and recommendations (Report, pp. 274 fif.), to facilitate, inter alia, reference to
the supporting paragraphs in the body of the Report. Numbering all paragraphs of the
Report makes its use much more effective and convenient.
10. "The useless profusion of punishments, which has never made men better, induces
me to inquire, whether the punishment of death be really just or useful in a well governed
state? What right, I ask, have men to cut the throats of their fellow creatures?" Beccarria,
An Essay on Crimes and Punishment, p. 102 (Transl. from the Italian, 1769).
11. From Chap. 10 of the Report, pp. 212 ff., particularly paragraph 609 thereof.
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1. The doctrine of constructive malice should be abolished;
2. 'Aiding or abetting suicide' should no longer be treated as murder, but should
be made a substantive offence punishable with imprisonment for life or for any
lesser term;
3. The law should be amended to enable a jury to return a verdict of manslaughter
where they are satisfied that the accused was deprived of his self-control by provo-
cation and that a reasonable man might have been so deprived, notwithstanding
that the provocation was by words alone;
4. (By a majority)-the M'Naghten Rules should be abrogated, or (with one
dissentient) that, if they are retained, they should be enlarged to cover cases where
the accused, as a result of insanity or mental deficiency, did not know the nature
and quality of the act, or did not know that it was wrong, or was unable to
prevent himself from committing it; and
5. (By a majority)-the law should be amended to provide that the sentence of
death should not be passed on any person convicted of murder who was under 21
years of age at the time of the commission of the offence.
In addition to the majority opinion, one Commissioner' 2 filed a note
of reservation concerning finding four, supra, expressing adherence to
the conclusion previously reached by Lord Blackburn 3 in 1874.
Three14 dissenting Commissioners expressed an inability to agree
with the majority that a case had been made for abolishing the
M'Naghten Rules or for abandoning a formula descriptive of the rela-
tionship between insanity, mental abnormality and criminal responsi-
bility. They attested to the inadequacy of the Rules while firmly resist-
ing their abolition and rejecting tendencies congenial to letting such
formulary slip into abdication. To these dissenters it appeared that
the prevailing recommendation contemplated responsibility as an ethical
question,', and as one which invites only a subjective response. They
further interpreted the majority's proposal as inviting abandonment
of a formula, in order to free juries in their deliberations, on the issue
of responsibility.
Stemming from past experiences, concrete proposals 16 to divide
murder into two degrees; to enact a new statutory definition of murder
of narrower scope than was extant at common law; and for conferring
power upon the trial judge to decide between death and lesser sentences
12. MR. N. R. Fox, Andrews, Q. C., Report, p. 284.
13. This was Lord Blackburn's statement made before the Select Committee on the
Homicide Law Amendment Bill, 1874. The gist of his position is recorded in paragraph
323 of the current Report at page 113.
14. DAME FLORENCE HANCOCK, MR. H. MACDONALD, and MR. LEON RADZINowicz. Report,
pp. 285-287. Their attack that the majority's conclusion is unsupported by the evidence
should have a familiar ring to American readers of opinions written by our tribunals
reviewing administrative decisions.
15. The basis for this contention is manifested by the material reviewed under "Insanity
and Mental Abnormality," infra.
16. These are qu9ted from p. 214 of the Report. Cross references to supporting para-
graphs in the body of the Report are correlated with the itemized statements of these
principal proposals so rejected. Ibid, p. 278.
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where convictions of murder have been returned, were each expressly
rejected"' by the full Commission.
Certainly their commentary,' 8 made when striking down the fourth
proposal to give juries discretionary mitigating powers through sen-
tencing, manifests the over-view held by all Commissioners on the
prime question before them:
... We have reached the conclusion that, if capital punishment is to be retained,
and at the same time the defects of the existing law are to be eliminated, this is
the only practicable way of achieving that object. We recognize that it involves
a fundamental change in the traditional functions of the jury in Great Britain and
is not without practical difficulties. For these reasons its disadvantages may be
thought to outweigh its merits. If this view were to prevail, the conclusion to our
mind would be inescapable that in this country a stage has been reached where
little more can be done effectively to limit the liability to suffer the death penalty,
and that the real issue is now whether capital punishment should be retained or
abolished. (Italics supplied).
Reaching that portion of their Report devoted to the alternative
to capital punishment, it appears that the Commissioners have presented
a profile of policy rather than firm conclusions when they suggest:1-9
1. A re-examination of the prison work problem.
2. It seems possible that prisoner's pay increases might be justified.
3. Humanization of prisons.
4. The scheme of anti-discharge furloughs is welcomed by the Commission.
5. "The principles followed by Secretaries of State in determining the actual
length of detention in each case in general appropriate for the purposes of pun-
ishment, deterrence and the protection of the public, without undue risk of causing
moral or physical deterioration in the prisoner; if, in exceptional cases, an excep-
tionally long period of detention is called for, the additional risk of such conse-
quences ought not to be held to rule it out."
6. "Strong support is given to the proposal already made by others that an
institution should be established in England for the detention and treatment of
psychopaths and other prisoners who are mentally abnormal, though not insane,
and for research into the problems of psychopathic personability. Similar provision
should be made for the same class of prisoners in Scotland."
7. "We do not think it necessary, except in special cases, to impose on prisoners
serving a life sentence for murder an obligation to keep in touch with the after-
care authorities after their release."
Their views on methods of execution are crystallized by the Commis-
sioners in the third part of the Report. Since most of these pertain
to situations peculiar to local operations they are of little moment to
the general reader save to note it was agreed that "Neither electrocu-
17. Report, par. 610, pp. 213 ft.
18. Report, par. 611, p. 214. Possibly a note of frustration is implicit in this paragraph,
but a reader of the cold record hesitates to attribute it solely to the Warrant's exclusionary
fetters or to mere dogmatic assertion.
19. Report, Part II, pp. 279-280.
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tion nor the gas-chamber has, on balance, any advantage over hanging
")20
Necessarily, the myriad conclusions and recommendations have
been painted with broad brush strokes in the foregoing narration.
But such treatment is not intended to portray any particular reaction
to their validity or individual value. To appraise them in detail requires
application of a sifting and testing process penetrating not only all of
the underlying welter of evidence, parol and documentary, but which
would go beyond it and extend into an analysis of the techniques
employed in gathering it.
Two groups of supporting materials21 were published in conjunction
with the basic Report; Memoranda and Replies to a questionnaire
received from Foreign and Commonwealth Countries2 2 consisting of:
(I) Commonwealth Countries (1951); (II) United States of America
(1952) ; (III) Europe (1953) ; and a collection of thirty-one separate
pamphlets containing minutes of evidence taken on various days before
the Commission.
Questionnaires were used by the Commission to elicit information
on the law of, and punishment for, murder conditions of detention,
insanity, criminal responsibility and the results of abolishing or retaining
capital punishment. In addition, information concerning methods of
execution was specially sought, and received from, Illinois, Louisiana,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, Colorado, Nevada, North Caro-
lina, Oregon, Iowa, Maryland, Washington as well as to those Govern-
ments which responded to the full scale interrogatories.
Perhaps this phase of Commission activity was more closely analagous
to a survey, in that information was channeled to the Commission by
replies to its questionnaires; through memoranda 23 especially prepared
at its request; by statistical reports24 and parol evidence given by wit-
20. Part III., Methods of Execution el seq., pars. 58 to 89, Report, pp. 280-282.
21. These documents are hereinafter cited as follows: "Q", stands for the three pam-
phlets entitled Royal Commission on Capital Punishment-Memoranda and Replies to a
Questionnaire; "R. C. Evid." refers to the Minutes of Evidence taken before this Commis-
sion. Volumes of Minutes are identified by numerals ranging from 1 to 31. However,
several bear two consecutive numbers.
22. Replies to the Questionnaire were received from: Australia (New South Wales,
Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, Western Australia), Canada, Ceylon,
India, New Zealand, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Union of South Africa, (Q.-I) ; United
States Government, California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New
Hampshire, New York, Wisconsin, (Q-II); Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, (Q-III).
23. Such memoranda are reprinted in Q-I., Q-II., Q-III., and in other instances they
are presented with the testimony of the author-witness. Most of these documents contain
valuable information and would require a separate review to accord appropriate recognition
to authors who gave so freely of their experiences and technical knowledge.
24. For some theories concerning the use of statistics in this area, see, e.g., ENRICO FERRI,
CRIMINAL SOCIOLOGY, Chap. 1, part 2, §109, et seg., and pp. 168 ff. (Kelly transl., 1917);
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nesses25 coming before the Commissioners. Consequently full dress
evaluation of the Report would necessarily embrace a statistical approach
in order to ascertain, inter alia, if the design of the questionnaire was
adequate and, as another example, whether the replies contained suffi-
cient ancillary material26 to aid in their translation.
Some adumbration of these replies is discernible in the major divi-
sions of the Report, but it would be necessary to trace each summariza-
tion back to the particular source paper in order to ascertain the weight
attached by the Commission. However, an over-view of this aspect of
the evidence indicates that, at least, this Commission was exposed to
the prevailing trend on the various topics discussed by the Governments
submitting answers.27  From the geographical strands in the net cast
by the Commission it appears they assiduously attempted to broaden
their investigative horizons. Visiting Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Hol-
land and Belgium, they heard evidence from about thirty-eight witnesses
and inspected various institutions.28 Sittings in Washington, Cambridge
(Massachusetts), New Haven (Connecticut), New York and Phila-
delphia brought contributions from some forty-one additional wit-
nesses. 2  The bulk of oral evidence was taken in Great Britain where
the witness roster included the Director of Public Prosecutions, the
Crown Agent, Lord Chief Justice of England, Lord Chief Justice
General of Scotland, representatives from the Home Office, Prison
Commission and English and Scottish Judges, Police and prison officials,
Members of Medical Association, Members of the Clergy, and wit-
nesses from various organizations. Oral examinations were greatly
facilitated by having witnesses submit memoranda"0 in advance of
GABRIEL TARDE, PENAL PHILOSOPHY, §97, at p. 544 (Howell transl., 1912) ; C. BERNALDo DE
QuIRoS, MODERN THEORIES OF CRIMINALITY, §4(3), zt p. 9 (De Salvio transl., 1911).
25. It is not amiss to note that the Report singles out for prideful mention Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, Professor Thorsten Sellin, Sir John Beaumont, Dr. Lansdoun and Professor
Sam. B. Warner, all of whom made valuable contributions to the intellectual arsenal of the
Commission.
26. An isolated example will reflect this situation, e.g., "Question 24: (a) By what
method is the sentence of death carried out? (b) Is this method regarded as satisfactory?
(c) What criticisms have been made of it?" Reply (Q-II, p. 752) from Connecticut-.
"(a) Electrocution. (b) Yes. (c) That it destroys, life." Non-response from Massachu-
setts on parts (b) and (c). New Hampshire-no information available to reply to (b) and
(c). New York-the Attorney General's reply: "This office cannot comment on these
questions."
27. An alphabetical list of witnesses who gave testimony in Europe appears at page
293 ff. of the Report.
28. Report, Appendix 2, p. 297, is a complete .itemization of persons and institutions
visited by the Commissioners.
29. The alphabetical list of witnesses, Report, p. 295, contains names of many prominent
American authorities in law and medicine.
30. Various individuals contributed valuable memoranda, which have been reprinted
by the Commission. Among those authoring such papers were: Professors Jean Constant
and Paul Cornil of Belgium; Professor Stephan Hurwitz of Denmark; M. Marc Ancel, M.
Ch. Germain, Professors P. Bouzat and Donnedieu de Vabres of France; Professor J. E. van
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their personal appearances. Moreover, such procedure brought a rich
mine of documentary information into the Commission's files and
which, in contrast to most of the testimony, provides better source
material. Obviously, the temptation to embark on tangential excur-
sions during examination of some witnesses could not be entirely resisted.
All the Commission's evidence cannot be subjected to comment within
the limited confines of this paper, and it is only with the most serious
deference to the various witnesses, that several are, here, singled out.
Certainly the testimony and memorandum of the Home Office, con-
taining a detailed study of previous proposals similar to those facing
the instant Commission is worthy of mention and detailed study. No
doubt the Report writers tapped this source with a free hand. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter was called and examined by the Commission in
July, 1950 and one of the salient aspects of his testimony lies in this
question 3' and answer:
Would you be in favour of reducing the scope of capital punishment-I myself
would abolish it.
CONSTRUCTIVE MALICE
Confronted with various suggestions extracted from its collected
data pertaining to limitations or modification of the liability to suffer
the death penalty, this Commission set up a rigid dichotomy between
altering the law defining that liability and investing judge or jury with
broader palliating powers. Thus, they say by abolishing the "doctrine
of constructive malice" and expanding the concept of provocation to
implement mitigation, the sweep of murder, without redefinition, could
be delimited.
Having traced, 2 at this juncture, the origination and development
of constructive malice, the Commissioners proceed to cut ground from
under this doctrine by an examination of judicial rubics inserted and
published in familiar decisions. Here it is enough to note that the
semantic problem implicit in the traditional phrase "malice afore-
thought"'3 3 has been squarely faced and recognized as "an arbitrary
Bemmelen and W. P. J. Pompe of the Netherlands; Professor Johannes Andennaes of Nor-
way; Professor Ivar Strahl of Sweden; and Professor Jean Graven of Switzerland; Pro-
fessor Louis B. SCHWARTZ, PUNISHMENT OF MURDER IN PENNSYLVANIA, (Q-II, p. 776);
DR. WINFRED OVERHOLSER, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW OF MURDER IN THE UNITED STATES
(Q-II, p. 779) ;Professor HERBERT WECHSLER, DEGREES OF MURDER AND RELATED AsPECTS OF
THE PENAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, (Q-II, p. 783).
31. Par. 7968, 26 R. C. Evid. 580.
32. Report, pp. 25 ff. The Law of Murder with a detailed note on the early development
of "malice aforethought" is reproduced in Report, Appendix 7, pp. 381 ff.
33. "Nothing is more frequent in jurisprudence than the confusion of motive with inten-
tion; and of this confusion the law of England affords a flagrant instance, when it lays down
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symbol." Their approach by-passes the etiological problem underlying
"actus non facit reum nisi sit rea." No doubt this ancient maxim laid
a heavy hand upon opinion writers who struggled to soften dogma into
principle for specific factual situations. 34  And it is the penumbra of
such ideas that are now echoed in this Report. For in striving to dem-
onstrate an awareness that constructive malice should be abolished in
England, since the doctrine 5 is widely criticised as "illogical, unjust
and unnecessary," the Commissioners state "No one would now support
the old rule that any killing in the course of any felony is murder."
And among authorities relied upon in support of this proposition they
cite reports issued by the Commissioners on Criminal Law in 1834-1845.
What chiefly emerges from the discussion on constructive malice is
cogently stated in these two sentences :6
We have no doubt that, as a matter of general principal, persons ought not to be
punished for consequences of their acts which they do not intend or foresee. The
doctrine of constructive malice clearly infringes this principle....
Then, as if anticipating the readers question they have added an
expression of confidence that English juries "can be trusted to discharge
their responsibilities" while delicately balancing fairness to defendant
and protecting society. But this answer dilutes their solution. Because
that murder must be committed of malice aforethought. By this is merely meant that it must
be committed intentionally." 1 AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE, Lecture 12, at page 355 (1869).
Reference to Sir James Stephen's description of malice aforethought on page 27 of this
Report brings to mind that this identical passage was reproduced by MR. JUSTICE HOLMES in
THE COMMON LAW, and used as a prefatory statement to the discussion on murder.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, pp. 51 ff. (Boston, Little Brown & Co., 1949 printing).
For an interesting sidelight, see 1 HOLMES--POLLOCK LETTERS, p. 21 (Howe ed., 1941) where
Justice Holmes describes his estimate of STEPHEN'S DIGEST OF CRIMINAL LAW in a letter writ-
ten March 25, 1883.
A good discussion of malice aforethought is found in PERKINS, The Lau, of Homicide, 36
3. CRIM. LAW AND CRIMINOL. 392, 397 (1946).
See, II AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE, 1093, for his discussion on the "inconveniences of 'malice'
as a name for criminal design."
34. ". . . for if the act be unlawful, I mean if it be malum in se, the case will amount
to felony, either murder or manslaughter, as circumstances may vary the nature of it. If it
be done in prosecution of a felonious intention it will be murder, but if the intent went no
farther than to commit a base trespass, manslaughter: though, I confess, Lord Coke seemeth
to think otherwise." SIR MICHAEL FOSTER, A REPORT OF SOME PROCEEDINGS ON THE COM-
MISSION FOR THE TRIAL OF THE REBELS IN THE YEAR 1746, Foster, Crown Cases, p. 258 (1792).
35. See, e.g., WECHSLER, THE CHALLENGE OF A MODEL PENAL CODE, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097,
1111 (May, 1952).
Compare the discussion of "actus reus" by J. W. C. TURNER, in THE MENTAL ELEMENT IN
CRIMES AT COMMON LAW, RADZINOWICZ AND TURNER, eds., THE MODERN APPROACH TO CRIMI-
NAL LAW, pp. 195 ff. (London, MacMillan, 1948).
"We think there can be no doubt that the severity of the old rules has been mitigated by
judicial decisions during the last 100 years and that the law is now no longer as stated by
STEPHEN," REPORT, par. 77, p. 29.
As pointed out, by the current Commission, their witnesses were "unanimous that the
ancient rule was absurd and objectionable," REPORT, par. 98, p. 37. They report some
difference of opinion as to whether it is now so "clearly and entirely dead" and to be beyond
need for abolishment by statute.
36. REPORT, par. 107, at p. 40.
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as the Commission points out it will be for the jury to decide between
murder and manslaughter in those cases lying between "trivial violence"
and gross violence or "where it appears that some degree of 'real vio-
lence' was employed."
Freeing proposed statutory provisions 37 bottomed on constructive
malice from a multiplicity of definitions proved to be an insuperable
problem 38 for the Commissioners. They struck down suggestions aimed
at reconstructing this concept, at the statutory level, because such enact-
ments restricting constructive malice to felonies "involving violence"
must necessarily contain the definitive characteristics intended to be
encompassed by the legislator. And sponsoring enactments grounded
in the theory that it is "the violence and not the felony involving violence
that should make such offenses murder" generates the problem of exclud-
ing "genuinely accidental killings" and this gambit, too, invites check-
mate by "definition." Clearly, then, preparation of blueprints for such
legislation is hindered by a struggle for communicable formulations.
Though they found the vitality of the felony-murder rule to be
undiminished in various American jurisdictions, it was noted that two
of our professors criticized the "doctrine" in their evidence. Thus it
was pointed out that Professor Wechsler 9 would restrict the sweep
of the rule to instances where there "was intent to kill or to do serious
bodily harm." Whereas Professor Schwartz" suggested confining its
applicability "to cases where some dangerous act was done, not neces-
sarily with intent to kill or cause serious bodily harm."
PROVOCATION
Viewing provocation as an extenuating circumstance, coupled with a
recognition of the frailities of human nature, produced, on the evi-
dence, traced in this record, the ultimate conclusion of the Commis-
sioners that:
Where the jury are satisfied that the accused killed the deceased upon provocation,
that he was deprived of his self control as a result of that provocation and that a
reasonable man might have been so deprived, the nature (as distinct from the
degree) of the provocation should be immaterial and it should be open to them to
return a verdict of manslaughter. 41
37. REPORT, par. 92, p. 34, it is noted that the law of Scotland does not recognize any
doctrine of constructive malice.
38. REPORT, par. 111, p. 41.
39. REPORT, par. 115, p. 42.
40. REPORT, par. 115, p. 42. Memoranda submitted by Professors WEcHSLER and
SCHWARTZ were reprinted at Q-II, p. 779 and p. 783, where their views are expanded on
these and other aspects of the total investigation.
41. REPORT, par. 151, p. 56.
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INSANITY AND MENTAL ABNORMALITY
An evaluation of the sweep of irresponsibility42 in law as a bar to
conviction and punishment necessitated examination of considerable
evidence concerning insanity and mental deficiency. And a review of
diminished responsibility was a natural by-product of this basic probing.
Defective communications, springing primarily from loose usage of
terms and imprecision of definitions in these areas, is all too frequent
between speakers, writers and readers. Diagnostic groupings from the
field of medicine are not easily transferrable to the field of law. By
delineating a practical guide or glossary of terms 43 employed in pre-
42. A trenchent discussion of the historical background of insanity in the field of law
is presented in E. FERRI, CRIMINAL SOCIOLOGY, pp. 356 ff., (The Modern Criminal Science
Series, Kelly transl., 1917).
43. An interesting contrast to Commission descriptions are found in several replies to the
following question; answers to which are hereinafter reprinted in the margin: (a) What
kind or degree of insanity or mental abnormality relieves an offender of responsibility for his
actions under the criminal law? (c) How is insanity defined for the purpose of the general
law relating to the medical treatment of persons of unsound mind? (c) Is every person who
is insane within the meaning of the definition referred to in (b), regarded as irresponsible
under the criminal law?" (Q.III, p. 794).
Sweden's reply to the questionnaire (Q.-III, p. 845) particularly notes with respect to their
Act: "By insanity is meant a profound pathological change in the mental faculties. There
is, however, no intention of giving to the term any meaning other than the generally accepted
meaning according to the usage and language of medical science."
"There are no provisions in Italian legislation for the definition of insanity in the medico-
legal sense," Q.-III, pp. 822.
Netherlands has no definition, but adds that "no punishment may be imposed on a person
who commits an act for which he cannot be held responsible because of backword develop-
ment or morbid disturbance of his mental faculties." Q.-III, pp. 828.
Norway replied as follows: ". . . The question what forms of mental disorder are
included under the term 'insanity' will depend on the views of psychiatric experts on each
occasion. The legal term 'insane' includes, in addition to mental disorders proper, gross
defects of intelligence (pronounced mental deficiency).... Neither in dealing with exemption
from punishment nor with compulsory detention in a mental hospital does the law give any
other definition of insanity, but the term is taken to have the same meaning in both
cases ... "
Belgium's reply: "... Insanity is not defined in any law dealing with the treatment of the
insane. . . " Q.-III, p. 798.
Denmark: no definition.
France--"The only provision concerning insanity in the Penal Code in article 64, which
provides: "There is no crime or offence when the accused was in a state of madness
(dfmence) at the time of the act. The state of madness contemplated by the law is that
which deprives the accused of all understanding and consequently of all responsibility."
Q.-III, p. 812. M. ANCEL, Institute of Comparative Law, University of Paris, supplemented
the foregoing by this explanation: "The law gives no definition other than that of article
64. The word madness (dfmence) refers generally to complete mental derangement; but it
is generally accepted that this provision should be applied to states approximating to (com-
plete) madness. Individuals with minor mental abnormalities, however, are outside the
scope of the law. In practice they are considered as possessing a semi-responsibility. ... "
Q.-III, p. 814. M. GERMAIN, Director of Prison Administration (France) contributed the
following explanation: "French law knows no intermediate degree between complete respon-
sibility and absolute irresponsibility. . . French legislation, therefore, provides only for
complete insanity and not for any other form of mental disease; it does not provide for situ-
ations between insanity and mental health." Q.-III, p. 817.
Compare: "Mental disease is a generic term intended to include all forms of fully devel-
oped mental disturbance which are recognized by medical science. . . ." From the summary
of PROFESSOR J. GAVIN'S memorandum, Prof. of Criminal Law, Geneva's University, Switzer-
land, Q.-III, p. 867.
[Vol. 44
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
senting their views on these topics, the Commissioners warded off
possible misinterpretations by readers, and simultaneously furnished
benchmarks to guide them in understanding the line of reasoning sup-
porting the final recommendations published in the Report.
Thus, the Commissioners use "mental abnormality" as descriptive
of all forms of mental disease, mental deficiency and personality dis-
orders. "Mental diseases" or "diseases of the mind" is the terminology
used to convey a description of that pathological transformation orig-
inating "de novo" in the mind of a maturing or matured person. Choice
of these words stemmed from the Commissioners' opinion that "disease"
connotes a mental deterioration, not previously existing, which induces
deviation from a pre-existing norm. The Commissioners felt that the
phrase "mental disease" encompassed psychoses, though medical men
would not regard certain of the conditions4 enumerated and so cata-
logued by the Commissioners, as psychotic. But there is some blurring,
in this part of the Report, between the word "doctors" and "phychia-
trists," it being difficult to ascertain if the Commissioners intended to
reflect an interchange of the technical vocabularies of each profession.
In any event, the Report spells out the sense in which various terms
have been used for its purposes. "Insanity," as a word, is here used
to describe a state where ". . . the patient is suffering from a major
mental disease (usually a psychosis) to such a degree that restriction
of his liberty is justified in his own or in the public interest" and he
can thereupon be restricted pursuant to the Lunancy Acts. Since the
phrase "of unsound mind" is not used by medical men it found no
place in the Report. The meaning accorded "responsible" lies in the
query pertaining to a particular person, i. e., "ought he to be punished,
whatever the existing law may be ?"
A fitting prefatory statement to this facet of the Report is found
in the memorandum submitted by Sir Norwood East :45
It is significant that no substitute for the M'Naghten test of insanity has been
accepted. It is too often forgotten that an alternative test must be capable of being
understood and applied by the jury.
This is a fair summary of certain thinking encountered by the Com-
mission and the following suggestion by the British Medical Association
is representative of an opposing view. That group sought to enlarge
44. E.g., epilepsy and cerebral tumour, REPORT, par. 212, p. 73.
45. F. R. C. P., Lecturer on Forensic Psychiatry, Institute of Psychiatry, Maudsley Hos-
pital, London University; formerly H. M. Commissioner of Prisons, 22 R. C. Evid., 511
(1950).
Compare, WEIHOFEN, The M'Naghten Rule in Its Present-Day Setting, 17 FEDERAL PRO-
BATION 8 (Sept, 1953).
19541
MELVIN F. WFINGERSKY
the M'Naghten46 Rules through acceptance of a formula whereby a
person relying on disease of the mind, as a defense, would be required
to prove that "at the time of the committing of the act he was labouring,
as a result of disease of the mind, under
(1) a defect of reason such that he did not know (a) the nature and quality of
the act he was doing; or (if he did know this) (b) that he was doing what was
wrong; or
(2) a disorder of emotion such that, while appreciating the nature and quality
of the act, and that it was wrong, he did not possess sufficient power to prevent
himself from committing it.
When a jury find that an accused person, at the time of committing the act, was
labouring, as a result of disease of the mind, under a defect of reason or a dis-
order of emotion to such an extent as not to be fully accountable for his actions,
they shall return a verdict of 'Guilty, with diminished responsibility.' '147
This is premised on a recognition of the loose interplay between law and
medicine. And it is not a mere time lag that is involved. Such reactions
run from medicine to morals to law and rarely per saltum. And this
phase of Commission activity was merely to inventory the doctrine of
responsibility to ascertain if it had absorbed current moral standards
by exposure thereto, as well as to ascertain if this doctrine reflected
contemporary scientific knowledge concerning the impact of mental
abnormality, on behavior and personality. Has the species of respon-
sibility kept pace with the evolution of mental disorders discovered,
named and catalogued by medical profession, is the question.
Despite frequency of investigations in these areas and advancement
of medical science 48 to its present status, these investigators were still
driven back to the recognition that a moral question confronted them
whenever they touched the question of responsibility. It is on this
point that the Commissioners avoided philosophical arguments, yet here
they point out that there is "no pre-established harmony between the
criteria of moral and of criminal responsibility. ' 49 Whether the current
46. Since there are at least 10 variations in spelling this famous defendant's name, it
was decided that "M'Naghten" should be used on authority of the report in 10 C. &
F. 200, Report, p. 75.
PROF. J. W. C. TURNER notes there is considerable elasticity found in current applications
of the M'Naghten Rules, which he reports in his latest revision of KENNY'S OUTLINES OF
CRIMINAL LAW, par. 53, p. 70 (16th ed., 1952). He stresses that "the courts are not concerned
with insanity as such but with criminal responsibility." (id. 70).
47. REPORT, par. 264-, p. 93. There is a note to this page of the Report, viz., "'Disease
of the mind' covers incomplete mental development as well as grave disturbances of mental
health; 'Wrong' means not 'punishable by law,' but morally wrong in the accused person's
own opinion."
48. Compare JUSTIcE CARDZO'S observations in his address of November 1, 1928, "What
Medicine Can Do For Law," reprinted in CARDOzo, LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS
AND AnRESSES, pp. 70 ff. (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1934).
49. The precursor to this premature closure lies in the Commission's announced desire
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doctrine of responsibility reflects both "contemporary moral standards"
and the latest medical knowledge5° is the core in the struggle for an
opinion on the cardinal issue, viz., retention or abrogation of the
M'Naghten Rules. This is the most sensitive area in the Report. With-
out defining their concept of ethics it was said by the Commissioners
that :51
Neither the law nor ethics can reasonably be expected to base itself on extreme
and untried medical theories or to go beyond what appears to be the general
consensus of moderate legal opinion. If the problem of criminal responsibility is
approached from this point of view, it should not prove impossible to find a solution
which will satisfactorily reconcile the requirements of justice with the moral feel-
ings of the community at large.
This record is not overflowing with evidence demonstrating the
manner in which "untried medical theories" attain such wide procla-
mation as to become integrated in the mores of the community. A
permissive inference concerning the basis of that quotation, could be
drawn from the Commission's admission that they approached the
evaluation of the M'Naghten Rules with a "practical and empirical 51a
spirit." Of course, the vital phrase, in the quoted description of a
facile solution, is the concluding one closing the circle at its point of
reconciliation between justice and moral feelings of the community.
The end-product of the quoted postulation envisages a jury resolving
the issue of responsibility without a pilot formula, allured by broad
discretion.
A short excerpt from the testimony of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
is not only pertinent, here, but serves to summarize the trend of thought
which the Commission found congenial to their position on the point :52
to avoid "philosophical arguments which have led to barren controversy in the past."
REPORT, par. 279, p. 99.
Reading that summary disposition recalls, for example, the chapter on "The Theory of
Irresponsibility" written by GABRIEL TARDE, PENAL PHILOSOPHY, p. 150 et seq. (The Modern
Criminal Science Series, Howell transl., 1912).
Compare, PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE, MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW, pp. 230 ff. (Brooklyn,
The Foundation Press, Inc., 1953). MIRAGLIA'S work in COMPARATIVE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY,
pp. 242 et seq. Modern Legal Philosophy Series III., (Boston, The Boston Book Company,
Lisle transl., 1912) contains some "philosophical arguments" (Report, p. 99) which the Com-
mission might have had in mind. REPORT, par. 279, p. 99.
See also, Jerome Hall, Prolegomena to a Science of Criminal Law, 89 U. Pa. L. REV. 549
(1941).
50. See: Psychiatry and the Law of Murder in the United States, Memorandum of Evi-
dence (Q.-II, 779), submitted to the Commission, by DR. WINFRED OVERHOLSER; OVERHOLSER,
THE PSYCHIAAIsr AND THE LAW (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1952) ; OVER-
HOLSER, Psychiatric Expert Testimony In Criminal Cases Since McNaghten-A Review, 42
J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOL. 283 (1951).
51. REPORT, par. 284, p. 100.
51a. "Empiricism implies judgment upon variant situations by the wisdom of experience."
From the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the very recent and controversial
case of IRVINE V. PEo. of the STATE OF CALIF., 347 U.S. 128, 147 (1954).
52. Par. 8064, 26 R. C. Evid. 587. PROFESSOR RAnNINOWICZ's question to the Justice.
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As the Chairman has told you, in England the M'Naghten Rules are very often
disregarded or very loosely interpreted. Am I right in saying that this is true also
of the United States-I believe that is a fair statement of our situation.
At another point in his testimony the Justice said, inter alia:53
• . . I would certainly not adhere to the M'Naghten Rules . . . . They are in
large measure abandoned in practice, and therefore I think the M'Naghten Rules
are in large measure shams .... I think probably the safest thing to do would be
to do what they do in Scotland, because it is what it gets down to in the end
anyhow.
The Right Hon. Lord Cooper5 4 testified about his difficulty in finding
a copy of M'Naghten Rules in Scotland for his use in preparing testi-
mony for the Commission. This witness stated that since insanity is
normally pleaded to stop the trial, questions concerning charging juries
on the Rules rarely arise. Insane persons simply do not stand trial in
this witness' jurisdiction. It is in Lord Cooper's testimony that the
realistic answer appears: 5
. . . I think myself that however much you charge a jury as to the M'Naghten
Rules or any other test, the question they would put to themselves when they
retired is-
"Is the man mad or is he not"?
Despite much valid criticism of the M'Naghten Rules on the grounds
of obsolescence and inadequacy, particularly in borderline cases, replace-
ment with a workable substitute remains the hurdle to solution. This
situation is analogous to a managerial problem, arising in commerce.
Management knows that a certain asset is depreciating, but is without
a replacement for it, at the end of its service life. But here the analogy
ends since commercial management can more readily ascertain if such
useful life has expired. That certain concepts underlying responsibility
have reached the end of their useful lives appears to find some support
in the evidence received by the Commission. But whether the solution
lies in maintenance work to be done on the Rules or whether replace-
ment is the appropriate solution is not satisfactorily concluded. Despite
valid appraisals criticizing the M'Naghten Rules on the grounds of obso-
lescence and inadequacy, particularly in borderline cases there remained
the hurdle of devising a workable substitute.
Accordingly it was said that if scope of the Rules were to be enlarged,
53. Par. 8068, 26 R. C. Evid. 587. This is only a small portion of a lengthy answer and
should be read in context.
54. Lord Justice General of Scotland, par. 5465, 18- R. C. Evid. 437. The witness said they
were once reported in a footnote to a Scottish decision of 100 years ago.
55. Par. 5479, 18 R. C. Evid. 438.
[Vol. 44
CA1PITAL PUNISHMENT
then the following formula, predicated upon the British Medical Asso-
ciation's suggestion, supra, would be recommended. 6
The jury must be satisfied that, at the time of committing the act, the accused,
as a result of disease of the mind or (mental deficiency), (a) did not know the
nature and quality of the act or (b) did not know that it was wrong or (c)
was incapable of preventing himself from committing it.
Mental deficiency57 was examined separately and treated as embracing
intellectual defects or "defects of understanding, existing from birth
or from an early age." The vein of inquiry here runs the familiar
gauntlet of definitional questions all pointed at the problem of what
should be regarded as a "disease of the mind." Abrogation of the
Rules enunciated in M'Naghten's case was approved by a majority of
Commissioners, with a strong recommendation that juries be permitted
to determine "whether at the time of the Act the accused was suffering
from disease of the mind or mental deficiency to such a degree that
he ought not to be held responsible. '"58 As pointed out59 in the Report,
these Rules are wanting in statutory authority and had been frequently
marked as questionable general statements of the law on this subject.
This appraisal was countered long ago by Stephen60 who argued that
these Rules represented views of many judges. But, at least, there was
and is continued and consistent criticism of the Rules from many, varied
and reputable quarters.
By their ultimate holding, it appears, that the Commission found
the jury process a convenient vehicle by which to escape solving a diffi-
cult problem. It is here that the three dissentients gather strength for
56. Par. 317, Report, 111. This is also recommendation number 18, chapter 14, Report,
276.
Briefly stated the fatal defect in the MK'Naghten Rules, according to the British Medical
Association, is that certain offenders who are insane in the medical sense are still held respon-
sible and punishable under law. This is the core of the evidence adduced from the medical
evidence.
57. "We use 'mental deficiency' in the sense defined in the Mental Deficiency Acts, as
meaning an incomplete or arrested development of mind existing before the age of eighteen
years, whether arising from inherent causes or induced by disease or injury. By 'mental
defective' we mean a person certifiable under the Mental Deficiency Acts; such persons are
divided by the Acts into four categories, idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded persons and moral
defectives," Report, par. 212, p. 74.
By statute, in England, mental defectives are classified as, idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded
persons and moral defectives, Report, par. 337, p. 117. -
58. Report, par. 19, p. 276. Compare Sir James Fitzjames Stephen's criticisms of
M'Naghten Rules, over the years, reprinted in considerable detail in APPENDIX 8, REPORT 391,
pp. 399 ff. APPENDIX 8 contains a useful exposition and historical survey of insanity and
mental abnormality in the field of criminal law.
59. Appendix 8, Report, par. 4, p. 398.
60. Ibid., p. 399. Conclusions reported by the Royal Medico-Psychological Association
and transmitted to the Atkin Committee (Report of Committee on Insanity and Crime
(Cmd. 2005, p. 31) are illuminating and recorded in the Report, 404.
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their separate opinion which contains this penetrating and pervasive
sentence :61
The advantage of a formula is that it serves to limit the arbitrary element and
to promote uniformity, as well as to help a jury to decide between conflicting
views.
Thus it is manifest from the Report, that the majority simply cast
on a jury the identical problem that these Commissioners were unable
to resolve with all the intellectual ammunition, skill and training ranged
before them. This is, no doubt, an attempted reconciliation between
"the requirements of justice" and "the moral feelings of the community"
reflected in the jury box.6 2 While here is a convenient escape hatch
for the Commission's majority, it overlooks the individual accused.
DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY
Those varieties of mental abnormalities which are not sufficiently
advanced as to debar an accused from pleading or render him totally
irresponsible for his acts, are not taken into account by contemporary
English law.6 3  Since the death penalty is mandatory in England an
accused afflicted with such mental abnormality will upon conviction
of murder be accordingly sentenced. The sole channel of reprieve lies
with the Royal Prerogative. The Home Secretary is empowered to
invoke clemency when the prisoner's mental abnormality warrants miti-
gation, not otherwise available, under prevailing rigid standards for
testing responsibility in judicial proceedings.
Thus in England, as in Scotland, officials exercising such palliating
powers can weigh" all the various forms of abnormality when evaluating
the propriety of the death sentence for a particular condemned person.
By this individualized study, responsibility is evaluated to ascertain
if it has been "substantially diminished" by mental abnormality. Each
case must be resolved in its own anamnesis, clinical differentiations,
psychiatric data and diagnostic report, among other matters. Special
difficulty is encountered with accused persons who are epileptics 6 and
psychopathic personalities.
Since there is a blurring between the extremes of sanity and insanity
it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw a clear line of demarcation
61. Memorandum of dissent, Report, pp. 285, 287.
62. REPORT, Par. 284, p. 100.
63. But cf. the English Mental Deficiency Act, see, e.g., par. 374, of the REPORT, 130.
64. Psychopathic personality is possibly excluded in Scotland, REPORT, par. 384-, p. 133.
65. Unfortunately space limitation prevents extensive description of the useful material
reported, e.g., the electro-encephalograph (E.E.G.) examination described in marginal note 3
to par 389, REPORT, 134 and par. 400, REPORT, 139, where results of these examinations are
related for a particular group of prisoners.
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between responsibility and irresponsibility. Coupled with this ineluctible
condition and the fact that a wide variety of mental abnormalities gener-
ate diminution 66 of responsibility, led the Commissioners to their final
conclusion on the proposal to introduce this doctrine into English law.
It was decided that this aspect of the investigation would range beyond
the scope of this Commission's power, and could only be undertaken by
another specially appointed body.
AMENDMENT OF THE LAw OF MURDER
Application of the death penalty can, of course, be restricted by
statutory enactments grading murder into degrees. But the Commission
declined to sponsor such redefinitions in light of various 67 theoretical
and practical objections which they deemed to be of moment. It is
disappointing to find that after their efforts all that could be finally
reported on statutory gradation was: "We conclude with regret that
the object of our quest is chimerical and that it must be abandoned. ' 6
Pennsylvania's statute69 is quoted in full as demonstrative of the
policy behind grading murder in degrees through legislative enactment.
Stress being laid upon the legislative declaration, in its preamble, as
indicative of the reasons for classifying murder into two degrees. And
it is noted that commencing some seventy years after Pennsylvania first
adopted this legislation, continuous pressure was exerted in England to
bring about a similar enactment. Obviously, these efforts were success-
fully resisted.70
Difficulty in drafting adequate and "rational" definitions of the several
degrees appears to be the theme of those who oppose this kind of legis-
lation. The Commission, itself, reports this was their obstacle. They
urge that objective characteristics of this crime must be embodied in a
legal definition. But the flexibility of such a penalty is dependent on a
66. Here it is important to note that the REPORT mentions the Europeans' wider concept of
"diminished responsibility," generally applicable to all crimes in contrast to the narrow scope
of Scottish doctrine.
REPORT, APPENDIX 8, p. 392 et seq. contains several Scottish decisions illuminating their
theory of diminished responsibility, viz., H. M. Advocate v. Savage (1923) J. C. 49 (RE-
PORT, p. 392) ; Kirkwood v. H. M. Advocate (1939) J. C. 36; H. M. Advocate v. Braithwaite
(1945) J. C. 55.
67. E.g., "The evidence we heard (ed., concerning the United States) convinced us that,
in those cases which go to trial, juries frequently return a verdict in the second degree
in the face of clear evidence that the accused was guilty of murder in the first degree."
REPORT, Par. 532, p. 188.
68. REPORT, Par. 534, p. 189.
69. REPORT, Par. 486, p. 168. No reply by Pennsylvania to Commission questionnaire
is printed. Apparently much weight was given to the memorandum of Professor Louis B.
Schwartz (Q.--II, p. 776) who described this statute in detail.
70. Various reasons urged by opponents have been recorded. See, e.g., REPORT, Par. 488
et seq., pp. 169 ft.
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broad range of factors which do not readily lend themselves to the
strait-jacket of definition. They are matters "for the exercise of discre-
tion." And when striking down proposals to grade murder, this Com-
mission has reflected the memorandum 71 of the Home Office in which
lies the pith of the views reported by the Commissioners on this sphere
of their inquiry:
There are not in fact two classes of murders, but an infinite variety of offences
which shade off by degrees from the most atrocious to the most excusable .... No
simple formula can take account of the innumerable degrees of culpability, and no
formujla which fails to do so can claim to be just or satisfy public opinion.
STATISTICAL DATA
A substantial component of the total evidence received, consists of
statistical tables,72 tabulations, graphs and diagrams. They could be
identified with two spheres of inquiry; one, pertaining particularly to
the deterrent value of capital punishment and the other group, a presen-
tation of more generalized criminal statistics. In either instance, how-
ever, nothing contained in the printed materials furnishes adequate
information by which to test statistical methodology. Tabulations pre-
sented in appendices to the Home Office's memorandum are those re-
printed in the Report. But the Commission has supplied some clue
concerning the value of statistics in the deterrence area by pointing up
"the difficulty of drawing any firm inferences from them."' 73
That there has been an utter paucity74 of reliable criminal statistics
in the United States has long been known to interested scholars. But
the fact emerges into clear relief by the responses of various States
71. 1-2 R. Com. Evid. 13; REPORT, Par. 498, at page 174.
72. E.g., Recommendations to mercy (England and Wales, 1900-1949) Table 1, Report,
9; Incidence of murders, per million of population, (1929-1949) Table 3, Report, 303;
Analysis by age of males convicted of murder (England and Wales (1900-1949) Table 6,
Report 308-309; Insanity and Mental Abnormality (England and Wales) Table 8, Report,
311; Reasons for Recommendations to Mercy (England and Wales, 1900-1949) Table 10,
Report, 312 to 313; Graph of murder rate for 1939 to 1951 (1938 as 100) Report, 319;
Homicide statistics' in countries where the death penalty is in abeyance or abolished, Re-
port, 344. APPENDIX 6, REPORT, 328 et seq., contains the statistical material concerning the
deterrent value of capital punishment.
That "Number of Murders known to Police" is the basic columnar caption of the "Murder
Statement" for England and Wales from 1900-1949, reveals the usual problem present in
such an analysis, as does Table 3, "Incidence of Murders known to the Police Per Million
Population."
Bachelor readers will be interested in knowing that of the 1,080 males sentenced to death
from 1900 to 1949, 209 of such males had murdered their wives. In fact wives, as a group,
led all other victims for that period. Table 4, Report, 304-305. Wives seem to be better
insulated against this type of untimely demise in Scotland, Table 5, Report, 306.
73. APPENDIX 6, REPORT, 328.
74. SELLIN, The Uniform Criminal Statistics A4ct, 40 J. CRim. LAW AND CRIMINOL. 679
(1950) ; Criminal Statistics, 4 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 579; ALPERT, National Series on State Judicial
Criminal Statistics Discontinued, 39 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOL. 181 (1948).
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to question 30 of the official questionnaire.75 This interrogatory sought
to elicit information, for each of the 50 years, 1900-1948, concerning
the number of murders known to the police; and known to the police
per 1,000,000 of population; number of persons convicted of murder;
number of cases in which sentence of death was carried out and cases
where the death sentence was mitigated. California reported, "no infor-
mation available relating to murders known to the police or persons
convicted of murder over any period of years"; Connecticut, "unavail-
able;" Massachusetts, "there are no statistics which have been collected
on the matters referred to"; Michigan, "figures available only for the
years 1946-1949"; Missouri, "there is no available information from
which the table requested may be prepared"; New Hampshire, "no
information is available concerning the matters raised in this question";
New York, only to the extent of a short table showing final disposition
of persons convicted of 1st. degree murder; Wisconsin, "'we have insuffi-
cient information to answer parts (a) and (b) of this question, as
there is no central agency to which matters of this nature are referred
and recorded."
Even this fragmentary background lends support to Professor
Thorsten Sellin's sad commentary76 concerning his attempt to assemble
statistical data for use, as testimony, before the Commission, viz.:
... criminal statistics are poorly developed in the United States. Judicial criminal
statistics are virtually non-existent and police statistics are of such character that
they are not usable in this connection.
METHODS OF EXECUTION
At the then Prime Minister's request 7 for these Commissioners to
consider methods of execution, their inquiry was extended beyond the
basic directive.
Hanging, electrocution, guillotine, lethal gas and shooting are the
current methods of execution employed in the Western World. In
75. Q.-II, p. 739. Continuous marginal notations are eliminated by citing, here, the
various replies to question 30 referred to in the text, viz., California, ibid, 751; Connecticut,
ibid, 752; Massachusetts, ibid, 754; Michigan, ibid, 758; Missouri, ibid, 762; New Hamp-
shire, ibid, 764; New York, ibid, 770; Wisconsin, ibid, 772.
Question 30 (Q.-II, 739) is as follows:"Please give, if possible for each of the 50 years
1900-1948, a table showing the following information: -(a) how many murders were known
to the police; (b) what was the number of murders known to the police per million of popu-
lation; (c) how many persons were convicted of murder; (d) (To countries where capital
punishment has not been abolished.) (i) in how many cases was the sentence of death carried
out? (ii) in how many cases was the sentence of death mitigated?"
76. Par. 26, 30 R. C. Evid. 649.
Professor Sellin's testimony occupied a day and is amplified by a memorandum, supported
by graphs, diagrams and tabulations. As usual the Professor's labors have produced a fine
source of materials, which are worthy of a more detailed examination by interested persons.
77. REPORT, Par. 700, p. 246.
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appraising electrocution or lethal gas as compared to hanging, the
Commissioners used humanity, certainty and decency, as yardsticks.
Upon the evidence it was held that simplicity and speed, attributes of
humanity in execution, favored hanging, though this method did not
meet the requisite standard of decency.
Only two other methods received serious consideration; lethal gas
(gassing by carbon monoxide) without a gas chamber and lethal injec-
tions by hypodermic syringe. The first was rejected since it is adminis-
tered through a mask and would precipitate a struggle, and naturally
cause a victim to hold his breath as long as possible.
Intravenous injections of hexobarbitone, or thiopentone were also
disapproved because of the difficulty in restraining unwilling subjects,
and anatomical difficulties (i.e., veins, layers of fat, etc.). Furthermore,
the British Medical Association vigorously protested against any member
performing this service or instructing lay persons in the techniques.
SUMMARY
From the collection of evidentiary materials, reprinted by this Com-
mission, several items are hereinafter extracted and highlighted, not
as gauges of specific conclusions and particular recommendations, but
solely for noting their independent usefulness;
1. The assembly of source materials for comparing legislation con-
cerning homicide, penal sanctions, insanity and criminal responsibility,
conditions of detention and methods of execution.
a. Particularly worthy of emphasis are the extracts from the
Indian Penal Code.
2. The exhaustive study of treatment given by prior Royal Commis-
sions to proposals for limiting or modifying the liability to suffer the
death penalty presented in the Home Office MemorandumJ 8
3. A note reflecting the accumulated overtones of legal dogmas in
the early development of "malice aforethought" and the doctrine
of constructive malice brings together familiar, but scattered materials,
as a springboard for further research. 9
4. Particularly worthwhile is the detailed analysis of law and prac-
tice in commonwealth and foreign countries concerning insanity and
criminal responsibility, assembled from replies to the official question-
naire.80
78. 1-2 R.C. Evid. 1 et seq.
79. REPORT, APPENDIX 7, pp. 381 ff.
80. REPORT, APPENDIX 9, pp. 407 ff.
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5. The summary of the law of murder in foreign and common-
wealth countries drawn from answers to the questionnaire.81
6. The need for an appraisal of the statistical methodology em-
ployed in gathering data by the Commission and by those sources
assembling such materials and passing them on to that body.
7. A helpful assembly of case citations and discussion lies in the
United States Government's reply to the Commission's questionnaire.
This reply contains a generous extract (including the Court's footnotes)
from the Brief for the United States in Fisher v. United States.82
8. Arguments supporting abolition of capital punishment are well
stated and supported by extensive data in two Memorandums submitted
by the Howard League for Penal Reform. 83
9. An illuminating review and statement concerning insanity and
diminished responsibility in Scotland is provided by the Crown Agent's
Memorandum."4
10. A concise recapitulation of the views held by the British Medical
Association, including thought provoking comments pertaining to
M'Naghten's Rules are set forth in its Memorandum. 5
11. A glimpse of the traditional application and development of
M'Naghten's Rules is provided by a concise historical survey of that
precursor to the polemics on insanity and mental responsibility. 86
This Royal Commission will have rendered a distinctive service if
its work activates an investigation of our criminal laws and procedures.
Contours of the legal, medical, psychiatric, ethical and moral terrain,
only adumbrated in the Report, require sharper focusing in our Country.
Certainly this report amply demonstrates a vital need for full scale
research projects in areas similar to those touched by the Commissioners.
Even a cursory reading of the several States' replies to the official ques-
tionnaire supports that contention.
It is manifest from the collection of statutes, cited to the Commission
that peripheral and transitory pressures have stimulated that hodge-
podge legislation. Too frequently the overlay of amendatory patches
has obscured original statutory framework. Clearly, codification of
penal laws should be launched from coordinated research centers; not
piecemealed from remnants cut in legislators' cloakrooms.
81. REPoRT, APPENDIX 11, pp. 432 ff.
82. 328 U. S. 463 (1945).
83. 13 R. C. Evid. 279, 27 R. C. Evid. 591.
84. 7 P. C. Evid. 167.
85. 14 R. C. Evid. 316.
86. REPORT, APPENDIX 8, pp. 397 ff.
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